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Abstract
The paper explores the relation between philosophy and rhetoric from a new per-
spective by highlighting the dramatic nature of the dialogue and paying attention 
not only to what is said about philosophy and rhetoric but also to what is shown, 
especially through Gorgias’ intervention throughout the dialogue in order to save 
a community of dialogue that inquires into the good and the just. This re-concep-
tion of the relation between philosophy and rhetoric implies a re-conception of the 
practice of politics itself, rooted in a philosophy concerned with turning individual 
souls toward the good and a rhetoric that motivates individuals to be turned in the 
same direction by the words of others.
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Resumen
El artículo explora la relación entre filosofía y retórica desde una nueva perspectiva 
al enfatizar la naturaleza dramática del diálogo y, por tanto, poniéndole atención 
no sólo a lo que se dice sobre filosofía y retórica, sino también a lo que se muestra, 
especialmente por las intervenciones de Gorgias a lo largo del diálogo con el fin de 
salvar a la comunidad de diálogo que investiga lo bueno y lo justo. Esta reconcep-
ción de la relación entre filosofía y retórica implica una reconcepción de la práctica 
de la política misma, fundada en una filosofía que busca girar las almas indivi-
duales hacia el bien y una retórica que motiva a los individuos a ser girados en esa 
misma dirección por las palabras de los otros.
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If two men go together, side by side, one man may spy a thing before 
his friend […] And if a man spies something on his own[…]then he im-
mediately goes around looking for some to show it to, to get some kind of 
information, and he keeps on looking until he finds someone. 
Homer in Plato’s Protagoras (348d1-9)
In the Gorgias, Socrates declares that he is one of the few 
Athenians, or perhaps the only one, that practices the true politi-
cal art by speaking on every occasion with a view towards the good 
and the just (521d7-e1). This is the only place in the dialogues where 
Socrates recognizes himself as a true politician. Of course, the ques-
tion is: what does Socrates means by that declaration? What is the 
difference between a false political art and a true one?
Although it is perplexing to see how Socrates qualifies politics as 
true or false, it does seem that Socrates is not being ironic by saying 
to Callicles that he is a true politician. In order to understand what 
Socrates means by politics, the relationship between philosophy and 
rhetoric must be redefined. By so doing, we can understand not only 
what Socratic politics does and intends to do with the individuals 
with whom he is engaged in dialogical practices that inquire into the 
good and the just, but also what Platonic politics does and intends to 
do with the readers engaged in reading dialogues that try to flesh out 
the nature of the good.
The dramatic nature of the dialogue sheds new light on debates 
regarding the relation between rhetoric and politics, although this 
does not mean that what is shown in the dialogue, through the rela-
tionships among the different interlocutors, can be extrapolated to 
what happens to the relationship between the concepts discussed, 
especially rhetoric, philosophy and friendship. Rather, I want to sug-
gest that the relationship of the interlocutors can be a new way to shed 
light on the debate over the relationship between rhetoric, philosophy, 
and the practice of Socratic politics. In this sense, my reading is just 
a suggestion that is grounded in a new wave of reading the dialogues, 
namely, an approach that emphasizes the dialogical nature of Plato’s 
texts and the awareness that what happens and what is shown in the 
dialogues can have implications for what is discussed in the dialogues. 
Thus, I will emphasize what is shown in the dialogue: the desire 
(βούλομαι) of Socrates to speak with Gorgias and finally the inter-
ventions of Gorgias throughout Socrates’ dialogue with Polus and 
Callicles. I will argue that the dialogue itself, the relation between 
philosophy and rhetoric and the practice of politics, based on what 
is shown in the dialogue, oscillates in a thin line between friendship 
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and war. It is no coincidence that the first words of the dialogue are ‘in 
war and battle’ (πόλεμος) but immediately after we hear those words, 
the word “feast” comes into light as a reminder that what is at stake is 
not only a battle between old enemies (philosophy and rhetoric), but 
also a possible friendship that may lead to a reconception of politics. 
Thus the dialogue is trying to build a community that turns individu-
als toward the good and the just and that inquires through dialogue 
what the nature of the good is. This is the aim of a Socratic politics 
that is being reshaped by Socrates’ encounter with Gorgias and by 
what Socrates learned from Gorgias’ art. This dramatic interpretation 
construes the dialogue not as a dialogue about politics and philoso-
phy (Vickers 103), or about the limitations and power of rhetoric 
(Nichols 1998), or about the good life (Klosko 1984), or about a par-
ticular period of Socrates’ life (Stauffer 8), but as a dialogue that has 
three intertwined layers: Socrates’s life, the relation between rhetoric 
and philosophy, and the practice of politics as the inquiry into the 
possibility of a community of dialogue. Hence, on my account, this is 
Ariadne’s thread for reading the Gorgias, a dialogue that starts with 
an allusion to war, makes its way to the possibility of friendship, and 
is silent about the possibility of constituting a community of dialogue 
aiming toward the good and grounded on philosophy and rhetoric.1
Socrates’Life: The Concern about the Other and about Oneself
At the end of the Protagoras, Socrates makes a statement that 
keeps its resonance in the Gorgias as well: 
[I am] trying to think ahead, carefully, about the whole future 
course of my life that I take so much trouble over these things […] it 
would be a real pleasure to have a thorough look into these things with 
you [Protagoras]. You more than anyone. (361d5-9)
This assertion is made at the moment in which Protagoras 
seems to re-evaluate and change his belief that the good (ἀρετή) can 
be taught, while Socrates appears to turn his belief in the opposite 
direction. Although at that moment Socrates was, more or less, in the 
middle of his life, he was concerned about its future. If we assume that 
his life had been an unconditional commitment to examining him-
self and turning other people’s souls toward an endless questioning 
1 Stauffer has insightfully explained the necessity of reading Platonic dialogues as a 
sort of journey. In Stauffer’s words: “Plato’s dialogues [just as our lives] are unfolding 
dramas, full of puzzle, perplexities and even intentionally flawed arguments […] they 
require readers to wonder, to question, even to speculate and then test speculations 
against later passages” (Stauffer 7).
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and ceaseless investigation of the good, the just, the beautiful, and 
the truth, then his concern is not solely a selfish one. It also concerns 
the possibility of turning people’s souls and constituting an involved 
community of dialogue formed by members that are open to being 
moved by others and able to reexamine themselves in the course of 
their conversations with others, as well as in the conversation with 
oneself. This is, on my account, the practice of Socratic politics.
In his conversation with Protagoras, Socrates acknowledges the 
possibility of the impossibility of turning others toward the good 
only by means of conversing with them. In other words, Socrates 
faces, on the one hand, the limitation of his philosophy of turning 
others toward the good, and, on the other, the need either to comple-
ment philosophy with a certain kind of rhetoric or to reconstruct the 
notion of philosophy by coming to terms with a noble rhetoric (Grg. 
504d6-7) in order to have political effects. This is why in the Gorgias 
Socrates is the one who wants (βούλομαι)2 to speak with Gorgias, and 
“learn from him what the power of the man’s art is, and what it is that 
he professes and teaches” (447b9-10). This stands in contrast to the 
Protagoras, where Socrates went to speak to a rhetorician because he 
was concerned for Hippocrates (310d3-4); it stands in contrast to the 
Republic as well, where “Polemarchus must playfully compel Socrates 
to join the group whose leisurely discussion will investigate justice” 
(Nichols 131).
What Socrates will share with Gorgias in his conversation is the 
possibility of cultivating a friendship and creating a community of 
dialogue. Thus, the harmonious and respectful tone in which the dia-
logue between them develops shows a common concern, a shared aim: 
to constitute a community of dialogue in which friends are mutually 
concerned for each other and allow themselves to be vulnerable by 
risking their beliefs and ways of life to the persuasive appeals of others 
(cf. Colapietro 1988). In short, the members of a community driven 
by agents and patients are able to turn themselves and be turned by 
one another toward a questioning of the good. This is the feast that 
2 The verb (βούλομαι) is a deponent verb in classical Greek, which means that it has 
a passive form but an active meaning. Hence it reveals, to a certain degree, that de-
sire or want is only possible if one is an agent and a patient at the same time. Desire 
is something that comes to us and drags us to something else. If Socrates desires 
something from Gorgias, the grammatical structure suggests that both Socrates 
and Gorgias are patients and agents at the same time with respect to each other. 
Perhaps the friendly relation that would be formed between them, as I will argue in 
this paper, is captured in the way Plato uses this verb to motivate the event of the dia-
logue. Socrates wants something from Gorgias (βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ) 
(Grg. 504d6-7).
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Socrates as well as Gorgias are longing for, but inevitably the frame-
work of the dialogue −as marked by the first words that Callicles 
pronounces: in war and battle (Grg. 447a1)− puts forth the prejudice 
that Socrates’ motivation is to prove the superiority of philosophy 
over rhetoric. In more general terms, the words expressed by Callicles 
reveal the preconception that any relation between philosophy and 
rhetoric is first and foremost agonistic and bellicose. Yet friendship, 
as Socrates acknowledges later in the dialogue, is necessary for com-
municating with one another: 
Callicles, if human beings did not have some feeling [πάθος] that 
was the same […] but if some one of us suffered some private feeling dif-
ferent from what the others feel, it would not be easy to point out one’s 
own affection to the other […] we are two lovers. (481c5-d3; italics mine)
This shared ἔρως is the necessary common ground for, yet not the 
guarantee of, a community of dialogue and inquiry.
If war and battle provide the framework of the dialogue and the 
constitution of a community of dialogue identifies the motivation, 
then the dialogue will display, throughout its four stages (Socrates-
Gorgias; Socrates-Polus; Socrates-Callicles; Socrates-Socrates), a 
tension between an agonistic dialogue which forestalls the possibility 
of a community of dialogue and a filial dialogue which is its precondi-
tion. These two oppositional but intertwined motifs (πόλεμος-φιλία) 
are what shape the Gorgias as a political dialogue. On the one hand, 
the community between philosophy and rhetoric forged by Gorgias 
and Socrates in the first part of the dialogue is gradually corrupted 
over the course of the dialogue, ending with a peculiar sort of dia-
logue between Socrates and himself about the afterlife. On the other 
hand, the initial concern of Socrates about the future of his life makes 
him also concerned about the others (Gorgias, Polus and Callicles). 
In the end, the concern about Socrates’ own life cannot be separated 
from his concern for the soul of Callicles, whom Socrates proves inca-
pable of moving. Only by taking part in a community of dialogue 
can one take part in the feast of one’s life or in a political relation 
characterized by friendship and care. Callicles is the one who opens 
the dialogue and the one who closes it, but as Benardete has pointed 
out, “Callicles, who is not known from elsewhere, would thus rep-
resent the time without being anyone of the time”(7; italics mine). I 
would add that Callicles is nobody and everybody (Jedermann), the 
possible future reader, us.3 Hence Socrates’ concern for Callicles is 
3 I am not attempting to make this identification on the basis of Callicles’ beliefs, al-
though they are quite pervasive in our days. Rather, I want to establish a comparison 
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Plato’s concern for the reader: what is at stake is not only the turning 
of individual souls, but also the possibility of a political community 
of dialogue −not restricted to Athens− that questions the good and 
the just.4 Rhetoric and philosophy are perhaps two allies in the war 
against the breakdown and impossibility of that possibility, two allies 
in the struggle of building a political community in which the indi-
vidual souls turn toward the good. Indeed, perhaps we should speak 
about a Philosophical-Political-Rhetoric that brings hope for the pos-
sibility of community in an age of cultural devastation (cf. Lear 2006).
Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Friendly Alliance
Platonic attacks against rhetoric are grounded in the claim that 
it pursues pleasure and not justice. Socrates’ remark that rhetoric is 
mere flattery (κολακεία)5 (Grg. 502d7-8) has been taken as his hostile 
stance against rhetoric. Yet at some points of the dialogue Socrates 
opens the possibility for a re-construction of rhetoric, that is to say, 
the creation of a noble kind of rhetoric that instead of being mere 
flattery, would aim toward the good and the just. In Socrates’ words: 
“one must use rhetoric thus, always aiming at what is just” (527c3-4). 
It is crucial to understand that putting this declaration at the end of 
the dialogue is not an arbitrary decision on Plato’s part, but rather 
the manifestation that Socrates really received what he wanted at the 
between Callicles’ dogmatism in the sense that he is not able to re-evaluate his beliefs, 
and his shamelessness. My interpretation is not far from Ann Michelini’s, who has 
asked in her article “On Rudeness and Irony in Plato’s Gorgias”: “Should we assume 
that Callicles is intended, in the context of the dialogue as a literary work, as an ex-
ample, a warning to others?” (59). It seems to me that the fact that Callicles might be 
a fictional character reveals that the Gorgias is a dialogue that goes beyond its own 
epoch, a dialogue whose historicity and temporality reveal a timelessdimension that 
extends the dialogue through time endlessly.
4 Christopher Long has pointed out that in order to think Socratic and Platonic poli-
tics we have to distinguish two layers of interpretation. On the one hand, we have 
‘Socratic topology’ which “points to the place (τόπος) where Socrates practices a way 
of speaking (λέγειν) that attempts to orient individuals and their relations to one 
another toward the just and the good […] The topography of Platonic politics thus 
points to the place (τόπος) where Plato practices a way of writing (γράφειν) that at-
tempts to turn the attention of the reader toward the question of the good and the 
just” (Long 2009).
5 Jacob has elucidated the meaning of the classical Greek word κολακεία, which, on his 
account, means “an excessive flattery that goes far beyond civility, respect and de-
cency. It is almost always to be understood as motivated by a desire for underhanded 
gain and shames its practitioners. It carries a heavy burden of disdain: no one would 
want to be accused of it” (Jacob 82).
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beginning of the dialogue, namely, to learn6 from Gorgias his art and 
the power of it (447c1-2).7 Nevertheless, one cannot stop thinking 
about what this philosophical-political-rhetoric would mean, as 
opposed to a flattering rhetoric. More importantly, we have to ask 
about the notion of rhetoric that is implied and constructed through-
out the whole dialogue, so that it becomes an activity interrelated 
with philosophy. Socrates, as the ambassador of philosophy, wants 
to speak with Gorgias, the ambassador of rhetoric. Both activities 
will be transformed throughout the dialogue and, as an indication of 
that, we will have to trace the transformation suffered by Gorgias and 
Socrates after their dialogue, a transformation only made possible by 
their willingness and openness towards the other and a shared hos-
pitality toward the new. In short, their dialogue and the community 
it constitutes is grounded in the spirit of hospitality (ξενία), just like 
the ambassadors of two cities at war. As Mark Munn has pointed out: 
In dealings with representatives of other states, whether they were 
ambassadors of rival powers […] or representatives of […] allies […], offi-
cial transactions were facilitated by personal ties of friendship among such 
men. In some cases these ties were ancestral, having been formalized long 
ago in the rituals of ξενία, guest-friendship. (Munn 67; italics mine)
This guest-friendship between philosophy and rhetoric might 
facilitate a new relationship by redefining the practices of their disci-
plines and the relation of these practices to their political effects.
The first question that Socrates poses to Gorgias through 
Chaerophon reveals two essential traits of friendship that point to a 
possible community of dialogue (a political community): (i) speaking 
on behalf of the other and (ii) questioning who the other is (ὅστις 
ἐστὶν). On the one hand, Chaerophon, as a friend of Socrates, speaks 
on behalf of the latter, and Socrates lets Chaerophon speak on his 
behalf. To speak with one’s voice is as vitally important as to let the 
other speak on behalf of oneself, because only thus may we undertake 
a communal articulation of being together. It is an acknowledgement 
6 The Greek verb that it is used in that phrase is πύθεσθαι (to learn from/ be taught). 
What strikes me as odd is that the traditional way to write that verb in Attic Greek is 
πεύθεσθαι. The word for “being persuaded or to be persuaded by” is πείθεσθαι. Thus, 
there is a keen phonetic and grammatical similarity between to learn from and to be 
persuaded by. When Socrates says he wants to learn from Gorgias, there is a subtle 
allusion that he wants to be persuaded by him of the power of his art. From the very 
beginning, to persuade and to be persuaded by another is a constant in the dialogue.
7 This is what Stauffer has called the mystery of Socrates’ interest in Gorgias 
(Stauffer  20). Throughout this paper, I will try to address the problem of this mystery, 
which is the very motivation of the dialogue.
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that a sense of togetherness can only be achieved by speaking in one’s 
own voice and relying on the other’s utterances of one’s own words. 
This relates to Socrates’ Apology (17a1-18c8) where, as Stauffer points 
out, “the city’s hostility towards him [was] in part because he was slan-
dered many years while no one spoke up on his behalf ” (Stauffer  10-11). 
Human transcendence, if such a thing is possible, is the attempt of 
being together and questioning the nature of the good and the just. 
Not only do Chaerophon and Polus speak on behalf of Socrates and 
Gorgias, but Socrates himself at one point speaks on behalf of Gorgias, 
though he demonstrates his awareness of this responsibility by feel-
ing ashamed. Thus shame (αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη)8 appears to be crucial in 
the development of the dialogue (Race 1979) and more generally in 
the cultivation of a community of dialogue rooted in friendship and 
growing towards the good. Hence, when Socrates appears to the other 
(Gorgias) as someone who is not himself, he feels ashamed because 
he acknowledges that what is at stake is his friendship and the com-
munity raised by both at the beginning of the dialogue. Socrates says:
I am afraid it may be rather rude to tell the truth: indeed I shrink 
from speaking on account of Gorgias, lest he think I am satirizing his 
pursuit. But whether the rhetoric that Gorgias pursues is this, I do not 
know. (Grg. 462e5-7; italics mine)
Shame is not only a concern for how one appears to others, but 
also a concern for how one interprets the others by uttering their 
sayings in one’s voice. Hence shame is a concern about oneself and 
about others, a concern that has to be emphasized if we are aiming at 
constituting a friendship and a community of dialogue to articulate 
and inquire after the good.9 To put the point more boldly, shame is 
the possibility of questioning oneself in the light of the other, and 
8 Race has noted that the word “shame” appears seventy five times in the dialogue, 
becoming the most pervasive word in the dialogue. I agree with him when he says 
that “it is Plato’s intention to restore the concept of shame to a place of importance in 
Socratic [politics]” (Race 198). He also points out that the sensitivity to shame is less 
notorious as the dialogue passes from one interlocutor to another. Hence Callicles is 
the one who has almost no sensitivity at all.
9 In Chapter 2 of the Genesis it is written that Adam and Eve “were both naked, the 
man and his wife, and were not ashamed.” But later in Chapter 3, after eating the ap-
ple of knowledge of good and evil, the shame was inevitable: “The eyes of them were 
opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and 
made themselves aprons.” (Citations of the Bible found in Velleman) To my mind, 
shame appears as a reminder of the fragility of community, and the dependence of a 
community on how one appears and lets others appear in it. The rational μῦθος that 
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questioning the other in one’s own voice. It is the possibility of re-
evaluating oneself by being flexible and responsive to the demands 
of the other. In the fragment quoted in the last paragraph, Socrates 
is unsure about the rhetoric that Gorgias is pursuing, he is unsure 
of whether his rhetoric is of the kind that sublimates pleasure above 
the just and good; his shame is rooted not only in how he is going to 
appear to others speaking their voice, but also in the fact that what 
he had learned from Gorgias is unintelligible for him at the moment.
As will be shown below, not only does Callicles become repul-
sive to this sensitivity of shame, but Socrates, while conversing with 
Callicles, also appears to be engaged in an agonistic dialogue by push-
ing aside his sense of shame: “Now continue as you began [Callicles], 
and do not hold back through shame. Nor it would appear, must I 
hold back through shame [ἀπαισχυνθῆναι]” (Grg. 494c4-6; italics 
mine). Here we can see that “Socrates is forced to be as shameless as 
Callicles”, he is forced to risk the possibility of cultivating a commu-
nity of dialogue with Callicles by not constantly worrying about how 
is he appearing to others and how is he uttering their voices.
The other trait of friendship that was mentioned is the impor-
tance of asking who is the other with whom I am going to forge a 
community of dialogue, and with whom I might be transformed by 
establishing a friendship. To know who the other is (ὅστις ἐστὶν) is a 
question inseparable from what the other does; activity and character 
are entangled notions. The first thing that Socrates wants from Gorgias 
is to ask him, through Chaerephon’s voice, who he is. Socrates desires 
not only to learn something from Gorgias’ art, but also to know who 
he is; he is aware that a future friendship and alliance between them 
might flourish, therefore the question “ὅστις ἐστὶν” constitutes the 
other precondition for being a part of and taking part in a community 
of dialogue and inquiry. What is perplexing is that the first question 
posed by Socrates indirectly to Gorgias is one of the questions that 
he has never been asked. Perhaps even Gorgias is not sure who he 
really is, but this is not detrimental to the exercise of dialogue. On 
the contrary, a “violent attachment to the self [can be] the constant 
source of all manner of misreading in every one of us [and misread-
ing the other]” (Lg. 731e2). Nevertheless, Socrates’ question has moved 
Gorgias toward the endless path of self-knowledge (γνῶθι σεαυτὸν) 
and arranged the table for the shared feast between rhetoric and phi-
losophy, that is to say, Socrates has begun his political practice with 
Socrates provides at the end of the dialogue thus seems to suggest the possibility of 
appearing completely naked to others in the afterlife, that is, perhaps as one truly is.
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Gorgias, an individual with whom a friendship might flourish and 
who is beginning to engage in a self-knowledge process.
Before Socrates begins his conversation with Gorgias, he lays 
out one of the prejudices and misconceptions that have sustained the 
dichotomy between rhetoric and philosophy:
it is clear to me even from what he has said that Polus has prac-
ticed what is called rhetoric rather than conversing […] no one asked 
what sort of art Gorgias’ was, but what art, and what one ought to call 
Gorgias. (Grg. 448d3-448e7)
Philosophy, at least as Socrates understands and practices it, is 
an activity of dialogue that tries to answer questions of the sort what 
is x? rather than what sort of thing is x? This is one of the apparent 
differences between rhetoric and philosophy (Stauffer 20). The tradi-
tional distinction between both activities has been also stressed as 
the difference between the play of questions and short answers, and 
the display of lengthy speeches (μακρολογία). This is precisely why 
Socrates warns Gorgias to keep his displays elsewhere and stick with 
the game of questions and short answers that try to elucidate the mat-
ter discussed (Grg. 449b5-7). Finally, the opposition between both 
activities has been laid out in terms of “the supposed Socratic appeal 
to the intellectual powers of the interlocutor” (Carone 21) rather than 
the rhetorical appeal to the emotions of the interlocutor. These three 
differences will be overcome by reading the Gorgias with sensitivity to 
the philosophical implications of the dramatic context in which the 
dialogue is set.
First of all, it seems that Gorgias’ brevity at the beginning shows 
that he is more concerned about the issues discussed than about his 
reputation, although there are parts of the conversation in which 
Gorgias puts forward his concern for reputation.10 I do not think, 
as Benardete argues, that Gorgias comes forward as more reason-
able than Socrates, because Socrates’ attempt to provoke Gorgias 
by praising him so extravagantly does not meet with any success 
(Benardete  13). In fact, if we look carefully at the text, Socrates is not 
praising Gorgias, but rather the way Gorgias is keeping his initial 
promise to give very short answers. Hence, both Gorgias and Socrates 
have set aside their reputation and are thus giving primacy to the 
matter discussed: what is the nature of rhetoric and what beneficial 
10 As I will show, Gorgias is not concerned about being refuted by Socrates, but rather 
about the issues discussed not only by him, but also by Polus and Callicles. This is 
why, as I will show in this paper, he intervenes later at three critical stages in the dia-
logue (Grg. 497b5-6 and 506b1-3).
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effect can it have with respect to the philosophical activity, and more 
specifically, to the way Socrates practices politics by turning individ-
ual souls toward the good and building a community of dialogue that 
inquires into the nature of the good.11
The analogies between rhetoric and weaving and rhetoric and 
music reveal something crucial about the notion of rhetoric that is 
articulated by Socrates and approved by Gorgias. Weaving, as in 
the production of clothes, has two different purposes. On the one 
hand, clothes hide something and show that which is hidden as 
something different from itself; on the other hand, clothes protect 
the body. In a way, weaving is concerned with how one appears to 
others, and how one can creatively appear in a way that is favorable. 
This is not so distant from what Nichols has pointed out by charac-
terizing rhetoric as “aiming at presenting one’s character in such a 
way as to dispose one’s hearers favorably” (Nichols 12). This is not a 
negative characteristic of rhetoric, but rather a positive one: a way of 
appearing to others in a way that is both intelligible and favorable. 
The need to wear clothes and the need to decorate λόγοι (speeches or 
sayings) imply that there is a latent shame every time we say some-
thing, a latent awareness of how others are going to hear and see us. 
This nuanced way of understanding and reconstructing the notion 
of rhetoric shows that as in philosophy, a noble rhetoric cares about 
the other and about the appearance of oneself. In this sense rhetoric 
is “the capacity to be moved by the other as a result of the persuasive 
appeal, rather than the brute force” (Colapietro 157). The difference 
between the capacity to turn or move individuals’ souls towards the 
good, and the receptivity to appear to others in a certain way and be 
moved by their persuasive appeal is nothing less than the intertwined 
relation between philosophy and rhetoric that is itself being woven 
throughout the dialogue and that is re-creating a notion of politics 
that is grounded in a friendship between rhetoric and philosophy, a 
notion of politics that is concerned both with the individual soul and 
the ability to move that individual soul toward the good.
11 As Christopher Long has pointed out: “the nuanced and important relationship is lost 
when clouded by a simple dichotomy between philosophy –which is said to involve 
the use of λόγος in an attempt to articulate truth and rhetoric –which is said to in-
volve the use of λόγος for the purpose of persuasion without an interest in the truth.” 
Christopher Long, “Lecture Notes Socratic Politics”(8). This tendency of establish-
ing rigid distinctions between rhetoric and philosophy is one of the reasons why the 
Gorgias has not been read as a dialogue about friendship orabout the reconstruction 
of rhetoric and community, but only as a dialogue of agonistic conversations whose 
aim is to expel rhetoric from the philosophical realm.
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The analogy between music and rhetoric also reveals the emo-
tional appeal or motivational component of rhetoric. Music not only 
sways our passions and thus moves us in certain directions, but can 
also produce harmony in the soul. Yet while rhetoric and music can 
move us in a certain direction, they cannot determine or, better stated, 
they are not fully and deeply concerned about the direction towards 
which the individual will be moved. In other words,
we are led to the suggestion that rhetoric more closely resembles an 
art that provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art 
that sways man’s passions than it does an art that might clarify the path 
to true health [to the good and the just]. (Stauffer 21)
Rhetoric can move but does not know where to move, while just 
conversing clarifies and inquires into the direction towards which we 
should walk together, but it lacks the powerful motivational appeal of 
rhetoric. Nevertheless, Socrates and Gorgias are becoming aware of 
what they lack and need. Hence, later in the dialogue, Gorgias will be 
concerned with protecting a community of dialogue that is directed 
toward the good and the just, while Socrates will be concerned about 
turning Polus and Callicles by persuading them to re-evaluate them-
selves and question the nature of the good and the just. Socrates and 
Gorgias are engaged in a common way of practicing politics: the cul-
tivation of a community of dialogue that inquires into the good and the 
just and whose members are able to move others and be moved by the 
persuasive appeal of the good and the just. This is divergent from what 
Vickers has suggested in his book In Defense of Rhetoric, in which he 
states that according to Socrates, one “must give up rhetoric as verbal 
art for philosophy” (110). Carone is, however, more convincing when 
he says that Socrates “conceives rhetoric in general as a means which, 
despite being ethically neutral as such, may be given a good purpose, 
and thus become a genuine craft under the guidance of philosophy” 
(Carone 223). Even so, the instrumentalization and subordination 
of rhetoric to philosophy suggested by Carone fails to recognize the 
degree to which there is a reciprocal relation between both rhetoric and 
philosophy, in which both give to and take from each other in ways 
that enrich their meaning and open new possibilities for their practice.
As mentioned, there are moments in the conversation between 
Gorgias and Socrates in which Gorgias tends to answer Socrates on 
the basis of his concern for his reputation rather than of a concern for 
the importance of the matter discussed. When Socrates asks Gorgias 
what rhetoric is about, he answers: “that which is in truth, Socrates, 
the greatest good and the cause both of freedom for human beings 
themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each man’s own 
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city” (Grg. 452d5-7; italics mine). The second part of this statement 
is not motivated by the common task undertaken by Gorgias and 
Socrates to cultivate a community of dialogue and a friendship that 
reflects upon the issues surrounding being-with-others; rather, it is 
motivated by an appeal to attract students to rhetoric, because they 
are looking to gain power over others and using rhetoric as a means 
to that goal (cf. Stauffer 26).
Gorgias’ concern for his reputation as the motivation of his 
statements is also revealed when he tells an anecdote that is funda-
mental to understanding his notion of rhetoric. In that fragment of 
the dialogue, Gorgias declares: “I shall indeed try, Socrates, clearly 
to uncover for you the whole power of rhetoric; for you yourself have 
beautifully led the way” (Grg. 455d7-8). This overture emphasizes the 
importance of what he will say and reveals his gratitude to his friend 
Socrates for leading the way beautifully to their communal articula-
tion of rhetoric and its relation to philosophy. This friendly statement 
shows that Gorgias and Socrates are able to partake in a community 
of dialogue in a non-agonistic manner.
Gorgias begins to tell the story of when he went with his brother 
“to one of the sick who was unwilling either to drink a drug or to 
submit himself to the doctor for surgery and cautery; the doctor being 
unable to persuade him, I [Gorgias] persuaded him, by no other art 
than rhetoric” (456b 2-5).12 This example, as Nichols has insightfully 
argued, reveals the nature of rhetoric, a nature that “need not always 
be mere flaterry directed to base ends; it can assist the true expert 
in attaining the practical goal at which he aims but which he can-
not attain by the means of his art alone” (Nichols 133). The story that 
Gorgias has told retroactively uncovers his answer at the beginning of 
the dialogue when Socrates asked him how he should be called (“Who 
are you?”), and Gorgias responded, “a good rhetor” (449a6). From the 
beginning, Gorgias was making a distinction between a good rhetor 
and a bad one, perhaps because he knew that rhetoric, as every art, 
can be used in a good or bad manner. What is crucial about the sick 
12 There is a remarkable similarity between Gorgias’ anecdote and the Seventh Letter 
(330c-d), where Plato says: “When one is advising a sick man who is living in a way 
injurious to his health, must one not first of all tell him to change his way of life and 
give him further counsel only if he is willing to obey.” However, Plato is stressing 
that the patient’s willingness is crucial to shifting his sickened way of life towards 
a healthy one, while Gorgias is showing that rhetoric seems to be able to make this 
shift without the willingness of the patient to change his way of life. This, I think, is 
the power of rhetoric. On the other hand, later in the Gorgias, Socrates urges Polus 
to submit to his treatment, if he is an unjust person, as if he were a sick person that 
needed surgery to get better (Grg. 480c4-8).
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person anecdote is that Gorgias persuaded him, because he was, in 
a way, concerned about the health of that person. Hence, he was not 
motivated to deceive the other, but rather to care for the other’s well-
being. Of greater salience here is the fact that Gorgias assisted the true 
physician, who made the diagnosis, in making effective that diagnosis 
by convincing the patient to take his medication, and, thus, making 
him aware of his actual condition as a sick person.
Rhetoric can assist philosophy in the sense that the latter’s diag-
noses can have a true effect or, in Gorgias’ terms, can “come into 
being” (γίγνομαι/γέγονε). If we reduce philosophy solely to the activ-
ity of making diagnoses and questioning the good life and the base 
one, then rhetoric becomes effective and beneficial for that activity. 
Nevertheless, this is a narrow, reductionist conception of philosophy.13 
Thus, Benardete does not parse the difference between rhetoric and 
philosophy quite properly when he asserts that we are in between “a 
dialectic [philosophy] that alters no one’s convictions and a rhetoric 
that is effective but knows neither how it is effective nor what it effects 
[…] [r]ationality is empty; rhetoric is blind”(Benardete 13). Rather, 
if the philosopher is the doctor, then philosophy is illuminating the 
nature of the good life and the path we have to travel for it, while 
rhetoric is fulfilling in the sense that it persuades us to take that path. 
Thus, philosophy is not empty, but illuminating; and rhetoric is not 
blind but fulfilling. Now Gorgias’ words become more meaningful: “I 
shall indeed try, Socrates, clearly to uncover for you the whole power 
of rhetoric; for you yourself have beautifully led the way.”(Grg. 455d7- 8). 
This can also be understood as you are beautifully leading the way 
towards the good life, but I, Socrates, have the power to persuade people 
to follow the path you are suggesting.
However after uncovering the power of rhetoric and its useful-
ness for philosophy, Gorgias manifests ὕβρις by showing his concern 
for his reputation in front of his students (Stauffer 31) by saying: 
And I assert further that, if a rhetorical man and doctor should 
go into any city you wish and should have a contest in speech […] 
which of the two ought to be chosen doctor, the doctor would plainly 
be nowhere, but the man with power to speak would be chosen, if he 
wished. (Grg. 456b5-c3; italics mine)
13 Perhaps, one can read the Gorgias as a dialogue in which what is at stake is not only 
the relation between rhetoric and philosophy, but first and foremost the nature of 
philosophy as an emerging way of living and thinking which was not robustly created 
before by Plato. This is just a thought that might push things too far.
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This highlights what would be a bad use of rhetoric, or a rhetoric 
that is mere flattery, namely, “the ability to win undeserved victories 
[…] [as] an ability that enables one not only to defeat other arts, but 
also triumph over justice itself” (Stauffer 31). In other words, a kind 
of rhetoric that aims towards overcoming the constraints of justice.
Although Gorgias is willing to cultivate a community of dialogue 
with Socrates, as has been shown, sometimes he still worries more 
about his reputation than about the matters discussed. Yet Socrates’ 
refutations will shift Gorgias towards a concern for the matters dis-
cussed and, more precisely, a concern for a rhetoric that aims toward 
justice. In short, Socrates has done with Gorgias what Gorgias has done 
with the sick person: persuade him to take the medication he needed 
for a good life. Only by carefully reading Gorgias’ interventions in 
Socrates’ conversation with Polus and Callicles will the outcome of 
their conversation come to light. And only by showing Socrates’ use of 
rhetoric in his conversation with Polus and, especially, with Callicles, 
will we see that Socrates was also persuaded by Gorgias and learned 
that “a philosopher would always need rhetoric if he is to be able to 
have any beneficial political effect at all” (Nichols 6).14
If the good, just as the truth, cannot be possessed (Grg. 344b10-c2) 
and remains somewhat indeterminate, though we may nevertheless 
strive hard for it as a lifelong project of moving toward it while ques-
tioning the path we are taking, then rhetoric becomes essential for 
turning individual souls. Socrates acknowledged that since we do 
not have a substantive and robust notion of the just and the good, 
we cannot turn people towards the good without the aid of a rhetoric 
that enhances the motivational and seductive component necessary 
to turn people toward the paths and activities of the just person. At 
the end of the dialogue, Socrates himself agrees that a certain kind of 
rhetoric is able to redirect (μεταβιβάζειν) the desires of the citizens: “as 
to leading desires in a different direction and not yielding, persuading 
14 Carone has argued that Socrates’ “enterprise in the Gorgias would be inaccurately 
described as mere exchange of short questions and answers for the sake of the truth” 
(229). Rather, he also uses long speeches (μακρολογία) to make the other understand 
what he wants to state. Thus μακρολογία, as Carone sustains, is useful at times to 
articulate a common understanding of the matters discussed. In fact, the dialogue 
ends with the absolute suspension of the give and take of short questions and an-
swers, because, at that point of the dialogue, the situation demands a μακρολογία 
to make Callicles understand the importance of what Socrates is trying to elucidate. 
Following Carone’s argument, the role that the Protagoras establishes for the rhetori-
cian, as the one who creates μῦθος to illustrate his arguments, has been interchanged 
in the Gorgias, where Socrates, the philosopher, is the one that appeals to μῦθος to 
manifest his point (229). 
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and forcing them toward the condition in which the citizens were to 
be better, those early men [bad rhetoricians] excelled these in noth-
ing” (517b6-c1). A good rhetorician or a philosophical rhetorician will 
redirect and lead the desires of the citizens toward the direction that 
will make them better than they are. This is not different from what 
Socrates is trying to do with each interlocutor throughout the whole 
dialogue; this is the political art that Socrates is practicing. 
It seems to me that philosophy and rhetoric together will show a 
way of having the good, without possessing it (cf. Gonzalez 20). In short, 
if we do not have complete access to the notions of good and just, if 
those notions are in between a complete indeterminacy and an elusive 
determinacy, we need something apart from philosophy to persuade 
people to take one path rather than another, or, at the very least, a 
re-conception of philosophy that encompasses a persuasive appeal 
and a motivational component characteristic of the rhetorical art in 
order to have political effects. We have to distance ourselves from a 
detached theoretical reflection on the good, and rather engage in an 
unending process of questioning what it would mean to be good and 
just. This requires us to be open and responsive to the appeals of oth-
ers that claim different approaches to that question. I hold that the 
conversation between Socrates and Gorgias is forging a friendship that 
might even become an alliance of two disciplines that need each other 
(Stauffer 38) to undertake the unending and life-long human project 
of being in between the good as something indeterminate yet desired.
Gorgias’ Interventions
The first time that Gorgias intervenes in the dialogue, is when 
Socrates is explaining to Polus that for him rhetoric is a phantom of 
politics (Grg. 463d2-3) and a skill at guessing for the sake of flattery 
(463a8-9). Socrates lays out those two conceptions –or misconcep-
tions− of rhetoric, when he attempts to speak on behalf of Gorgias. 
However, Socrates explains this by assuming that Polus already knows 
this, that is, as if Polus knew what conception of rhetoric Socrates 
has developed through his conversation with Gorgias. At this point, 
Gorgias intervenes by saying: “But by Zeus, Socrates, even I myself 
do not comprehend what you’re saying!”(463d7-8). In other words, 
Gorgias is forcing Socrates to clarify his statement, not only because 
accountability and being intelligible to the other are two necessary 
conditions to maintain the community of dialogue that they have 
cultivated, but also because Gorgias is surprised that Socrates is hold-
ing that conception of rhetoric after what he had said to him. Gorgias’ 
intervention is intended, on the one hand, to demand that Socrates 
justify his assertion, and on the other hand, it is an exhortation to 
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Socrates to re-evaluate his conception of rhetoric as mere flattery and 
a mere ghostly part of politics. Socrates acknowledges that he is being 
unclear and is grateful to Gorgias for letting him know that. 
The friendship and the community of dialogue that Gorgias and 
Socrates have cultivated becomes tangible not only in Gorgias’ first 
intervention, but also in Socrates’ remark before conversing with 
Polus, a remark that reminds him what it means to be part of the 
community of dialogue that he and Gorgias have created together: 
If you are speaking at length and are unwilling to answer what is 
asked, would I on the other hand not suffer terrible things, if it will not 
be allowed me to go away and not to listen to you? But if something in 
the argument that has been stated bothers you and you wish to set it 
upright, as I was just saying, take back what seems good to you, and, in 
your turn asking and being asked, just as Gorgias and I, refute and be 
refuted. (Grg. 461e4-462a5; italics mine)
Socrates is inducing Polus to fit the standard of the dialogue that 
he and Gorgias established, a dialogue which, as Socrates points out, 
was a transformative one. It was an interaction in which both par-
ticipants, while refuting and being refuted, changed their original 
positions for a more inclusive one. 
The second time that Gorgias intervenes has a more dramatic 
effect than the first time, because it demonstrates, on the one hand, 
that Gorgias has overcome his concern for his reputation, and is only 
concerned about the matter discussed and the community of dia-
logue in which all of them –Socrates, Polus, Callicles and him− are 
participating. On the other hand, it is an intervention that takes place 
at a critical moment of the dialogue, a moment in which the conversa-
tion between Callicles and Socrates is about to breakdown, because 
both of them are conversing in an agonistic manner. Therefore, the 
community of inquiry and dialogue is close to dissolving and reveals 
itself as utterly fragile. Socrates accuses Callicles of being coy, whereas 
Callicles stresses that Socrates is saying silly things (Grg. 497a9-11). At 
the moment when each of them is disqualifying the other’s attitude or 
arguments −perhaps with good reason− Gorgias intervenes and urges 
Callicles to continue the conversation by saying, “Don’t Callicles; but 
answer for our sake too so that the argument may be brought to an 
end” (497b5-6). The emphasis on the community is more than evi-
dent, because what is at stake is neither Gorgias’ reputation, nor that 
of Callicles or Socrates; rather, it is the community of dialogue and 
inquiry that they have established and cultivated. Let me repeat the 
phrase, “is for our sake too”. What matters for Gorgias is the matter 
discussed, because he knows that justice and the good are the greatest 
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good for human beings and the cause of their freedom; hence, he 
immediately warns Callicles that what is at stake “is not at all your 
honor [θεμιτόν][…] Submit to Socrates’ refuting however he wishes” 
(497b9-11).The honor of the participants that undertake a communal 
articulation and questioning of the good and the just has to be put 
aside if their examination and re-evaluation is going to continue. 
In short, without risking oneself, there is no point in entering into a 
communal dialogue and inquiry.
Before explaining the reason for Gorgias’ last intervention, it is 
necessary to describe the context in which it happens, because it marks 
the transition from the conversation between Socrates and Callicles 
to the Socratic monologue or soliloquy. The hard time that Socrates 
has in turning Callicles’ soul so that he remain in the community 
of dialogue without his agonistic and antagonistic remarks and atti-
tude against Socrates can be shown in his allusion to the necessity of 
punishing Callicles for his own soul’s benefit. It seems to me that at 
that point of the conversation Socrates’ friendship with Callicles is 
transformed into a possible impossibility. Socrates has foreseen that 
a community of dialogue with Callicles will remain as an optimis-
tic hope that appears not to be possible under those circumstances. 
Callicles does not even want to continue the conversation, and thus 
threatens Socrates by saying, “if you are persuaded by me, you’ll bid 
this argument farewell, or else you’ll converse with someone else” 
(Grg. 305d4-6). What does it mean to say that if Callicles persuades 
Socrates he will have to throw away his argument or converse with 
other people? Callicles appears not to have even the most remote con-
cern about his discussion with Socrates; one might even say that he 
has no concern for elucidating and questioning the nature of the good 
and the just as something other than an orientation to gain pleasure 
and possess the things that he wishes to have. As was suggested at the 
beginning, Callicles is nobody and everybody, and thus he is “willing 
to say what other people think but not dare to admit” (Klosko 136).15
If Socrates is persuaded to say farewell to the conversation, 
Callicles will have made him acknowledge that every genuine dia-
logue and shared community of inquiry, including the one that he 
and Gorgias have forged together, requires two conditions to flourish 
and grow: (i) that a person is willing, or is able to be moved by the 
other and (ii) that a person possesses a sense of shame. Callicles is 
15 In a few words, Callicles’ claims regarding hedonism and his critique of Socratic jus-
tice and politics could be the claims of almost any reader. Hence, perhaps Socrates’ 
effort to turn Callicles’ soul, could be interpreted as Plato’s effort to turn some of his 
most dogmatic readers.
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neither willing to be moved by Socrates’ utterances to reevaluate his 
own position, nor does he possess a sense of shame. In short, what 
is at stake at that moment is the very limits of the community based 
on friendship that Gorgias and Socrates managed to shape. If that 
community faces a person with the those characteristics, it is very 
difficult for Socratic politics and Gorgianic noble rhetoric to turn 
that individual toward the good, that is, to make him acknowledge 
the pervasive fallibility of his beliefs. Perhaps Socrates was wrong 
when he thought that between him and Callicles there was a common 
ground upon which a transformative dialogue could emerge. Socrates 
noted that Callicles cares about something other than himself: the 
Athenian people and the son of Pyrilampes (Grg. 481d5-6). In fact, 
Callicles shows concern for his friendship with Gorgias, because he is 
conversing with Socrates just because Gorgias asked him to. Yet this 
filial dimension shared apparently by Socrates and Callicles is so frag-
ile, and maybe inexistent, that the possibility of a friendship between 
them, as the soil upon which a community of dialogue can emerge, is 
precluded. This is something which Plato is silent about.
This silence reinforces the idea that the Gorgias is a dialogue that 
it is silent about the constitution of a community of dialogue. The har-
monious conversation with Gorgias, deteriorated into an impersonal 
dialogue with Polus, which, in its turn, falls into an utterly agonistic 
dialogue with a shameless Callicles. And ultimately it deteriorates 
into a monologue displayed by Socrates when the possibility of a com-
munity of dialogue appears to breakdown. Yet Socrates’ final words 
bear some hope for making possible what seemed impossible, words 
that emphasize a we-consciousness, a sense of togetherness, a shared 
inquiry that aims at urging others to join the community of dialogue 
and to live and die for the good life:
Let us then use the argument that has now revealed itself like a 
leader, which indicates to us that this way of life is the best: to live and 
die practicing both justice and the rest of virtue. Let us then follow this 
argument, and let us urge the others on to it, not to that one which you 
believe Callicles. (Grg. 527e2-6)
With this statement Socrates revives the possibility of doing what 
he said before in the dialogue: I want to “persuade you to change your 
position, and instead of the insatiable and intemperate life to choose 
the orderly life. Well, am I persuading you?” (Grg. 493c6-d2). That is 
the question that every reader has when faced with the last words of 
the dialogue: has Socrates, through the use of his noble rhetoric, per-
suaded Callicles to turn his position or not?
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The moment when Socrates hesitates, deciding whether he should 
leave or not, Gorgias intervenes for the last time and declares: 
But it doesn’t seem to me, Socrates, that we should go away yet; 
rather, you should finish going through the argument. And it appears to 
me that it seems to the others too. I myself, in any case, wish to hear you 
go through the remaining things by yourself. (Grg. 506a9-b3)
At first glance it seems that Gorgias is motivating Socrates to 
remain in the community and not make effective the cowardice that 
Callicles pressed on Socrates in the first lines of the dialogue. Hence 
Gorgias’ intervention is crucial in the sense that it saves Socrates from 
becoming a coward by destroying the community of dialogue that 
they have forged together. In other words, Gorgias is manifesting a 
gesture of friendship in a framework of war, a gesture that will per-
haps save the community’s breakdown. 
The third intervention shows that Gorgias has taken the medica-
tion that Socrates persuaded him to take, proving that a true friendship 
emerged between them. Gorgias is persuading Socrates to keep the 
dialogue going, and Socrates is being responsive to Gorgias’ words by 
continuing the dialogue by himself, if there is no other choice. This 
time it is Gorgias who wants (βούλομαι) something from Socrates, he 
wants Socrates to save the community of dialogue that is at stake, he 
wants a philosophical rhetoric and a rhetorical philosophy to be able 
to turn an individual soul that is incapable of being turned. Callicles’ 
soul and his threat to a community of dialogue is the Political Problem 
for a rhetoric rooted in philosophy and a philosophy rooted in rheto-
ric. In short, Callicles has a destructive notion of community, one that 
is “an available means to the rhetor’s private ends” (Kastely 99). 
As has been shown, Gorgias’s interventions are crucial for 
sustaining the community of dialogue and inquiry that had been cul-
tivated. As Kastely has noted: “Gorgias’ role is not simply to be the foil 
who makes errors that Socrates can then point out, rather it is to be a 
dedicated rhetorician whose conversation reveals his social commit-
ment” (Kastely 99).
Socratic Persuasion and the True Political Art
The distinction that emerges in the dialogue between a rhetoric that 
is mere flattery and a noble kind of rhetoric is based on “the difference 
between aiming at pleasure and struggling to make the citizens good” 
(Stauffer 127).16 If we consider Socrates as a rhetor he would be a good one, 
16 Even Callicles is willing to accept that distinction between a rhetoric aimed at plea-
suring others and oneself and a rhetoric aimed at cultivating justice; in his words, 
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because he is always aiming to turn individual souls toward the good 
and thus inviting them to participate in a community of dialogue that 
questions and discusses the important matters of our being in the world, 
and, more specifically, of our being with others in the world. However, 
he warns us that this noble rhetoric has not yet come into being, or in 
his words, the rhetoric that makes preparations for the citizens’souls 
in order to make them as good as possible: “you have never yet seen” 
(Grg. 503a7-b2). Perhaps this means that the concept of a philosophical 
rhetoric or a noble rhetoric is just emerging in this dialogue after Socrates 
established a friendship and an alliance with Gorgias. Callicles himself 
acknowledges that he cannot mention anyone that has used rhetoric for 
the sake of the other’s soul and the city where he lives17 instead of for his 
own private purposes. In fact, he cannot think of anybody who is able to 
lead the citizens’ desires in certain direction, “forcing them toward the 
condition in which the citizens were to be better” (517b6-10).This leads 
us to the famous passage in which Socrates declares that he is one of the 
few Athenians, or perhaps the only one, that practices the true political 
art by speaking with a view towards the good and the just on every occa-
sion (521d7-e1). This passage suggests that Socrates might be the person 
that Callicles is not naming; in other words, this passage suggest that 
every time Socrates tries to persuade somebody, his attempt is always 
aiming at the good and the just. My claim is that only after establishing 
a friendship between philosophy and rhetoric can the true political art, 
which Socrates claims to practice, come to light. The true political art 
is grounded in a philosophical rhetoric and a rhetorical philosophy, the 
true political art involves trying to create a community of dialogue that 
inquires into the nature of the good and whose members are disposed to 
be moved by the good. The true political practice is a dialogical practice 
in a community that tries to lead the way toward the good and the just. 
This is why Socrates is perhaps the only Athenian who practices such 
an art, one whose content is not big speeches (μακρολογία) but endless 
dialogues (διαλέγεσθαι).
Returning to Gorgias’ anecdote about the sick person, one might 
say that his persuasion of the patient and the use of rhetoric at that 
moment aimed toward the good. Likewise, Socrates’ use of rhetoric 
with Polus and Callicles is aimed at their taking their soul’s medi-
“there are some [rhetors] who care about the citizens when they say what they say, 
and there are also such as you say [who just want to gratify the citizens as if they were 
little children]” (Grg. 503a1-3).
17 James Kastely has pointed out that the Gorgias can be read as an “empirical inves-
tigation that seeks a non-corrupt rhetor” (99). Perhaps more than an investigation 
that seeks a good rhetor, the dialogue can be read as a manifestation of Socrates 
becoming one.
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cation, and thus become good citizens, that is, citizens who do not 
believe that the existence of the community is to satisfy one’s desires 
or “that all public relations are merely a mask of private interests” 
(Kastely 99). Socrates is being both, Gorgias’ brother and Gorgias 
himself,18 because he is not only diagnosing how Polus and Callicles 
should live their lives in a community, but also trying to persuade 
them to take the medication that he had prescribed.19
In the conversation between Socrates and Polus, the former was not 
sure what he had learned from Gorgias, or, at least, it was unintelligible 
for him at that moment in the dialogue. Nevertheless, in his conversa-
tion with Callicles he is not only performing a rhetorical art aimed at 
turning individuals toward the question of the good and the just, but he 
is also aware of what would it mean to be a good rhetor. Socrates is now 
articulating what seemed to him unintelligible. He is arguing that 
a rhetor −the artful and good one− will look toward these things 
[soul’s arrangement], when he applies to souls both the speeches that he 
speaks and all actions; and when he gives something as a gift, he will 
give it, and when he takes something away, he will take it away, always 
directing his mind toward how he may get justice to come into being 
[again the vocabulary of γίγνομαι] in the citizens’ souls and injustice to 
be removed. (Grg. 504d1-e2)
This is nothing less than the statement of what Socrates has lear-
ned from Gorgias’ art, a statement that elucidates his reference to a 
noble rhetoric aiming always toward the best (Grg. 527c3-4). I believe 
that in the dialogue with Polus and, in a way, with Callicles, Socrates 
has made use of this noble rhetoric, which is not aimed at multitudes 
but at individuals; this noble rhetoric or philosophical rhetoric is pre-
cisely what I understand Socratic politics to be.
Recall the moment in which Socrates explicitly reveals to Callicles 
that he is trying to persuade him, just as Gorgias tried to persuade the 
sick person to take his medication. Socrates is tuning his lyre so that 
the music of his utterances is able to move and rearrange Callicles’ 
soul in an orderly and proportional manner; in other words, Socrates 
is weaving a cloak for Callicles to protect his soul from the suffering 
he will face in the afterlife (Grg. 523c2-525a8). Socrates says to Callicles: 
I want “to persuade you to change your position, and instead of the 
18 Since Christopher Long has pointed out that the relationship between rhetoric and 
philosophy might go beyond how I have conceived it, perhaps the friendship between 
Socrates and Gorgias is essentially a brotherhood.
19 A couple of times in this dialogue Socrates compares himself with a physician, see 
Grg. 522a4-5 and 480c5-7.
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insatiable and intemperate life to choose the orderly, sufficient and 
satisfied with the things that are ever at hand” (493c6-d1). However, 
Socrates’ intention to turn Callicles might fail, as I have pointed out, 
yet he will use any means possible to change his position. The myth 
of the afterlife illustrates that Socrates is giving up the elenchus to 
turn Callicles, he is giving up the possibility to turn his soul by the 
means of dialogue. The creation of dreary imagery exemplified in the 
myth is the last means that Socrates has for that purpose. What is at 
stake with Callicles is the power of rhetoric and philosophy combined 
together for the exercise of the true political art. If Callicles remains 
as he is, then neither rhetoric nor philosophy, nor the two of them 
together have unlimited power; if Callicles maintains his aggressive 
position, then philosophy and rhetoric face a limit to their exercise in 
political affairs: a person that is not willing to be moved by another’s 
persuasive appeal and a person that is not able to risk himself by ree-
valuating his beliefs and commitments.
The range of the transformative capacity of dialogue and rheto-
ric is what we as readers cannot but question: Is Callicles moved in 
any way by Socrates? Did Socrates redirect his desires and make him 
walk the path of striving to be a good citizen? Socrates’ concern for 
Callicles is intrinsically related to his concern for his own life, because 
the goal of his philosophical life was precisely to live “straining to 
direct all one’s own and the city’s things toward this, that justice and 
moderation will be present in them” (507d7-e1). In a way, Socrates’ 
concern for his life might be interpreted as a concern that his activity 
and his practice of politics might encounter an insuperable bound-
ary; philosophy and rhetoric together might not be as powerful as 
Socrates and Gorgias wanted them to be, and, surely, as most of us 
wanted them to be. This is why if we take the “logographic neces-
sity” (Strauss  42) seriously, Plato is not telling us something irrelevant 
and arbitrary when he ends the dialogue with the word ‘Callicles’ and 
with no response to Socrates’ myth.
The Silence about Turning Callicles and the Limits  
of Socratic Politics
Socrates is well aware that any community of dialogue and inquiry 
has to be grounded on a certain kind of friendship. Somebody who is 
unable to be turned by the other and that does not show hospitality 
towards the other’s utterances is a limitation to any community. In 
Socrates’ terms, “he would be unable to share in common, and he in 
whom there is no community would not have friendship” (Grg. 507e5-6).
Callicles is perhaps that person who does not have hospitality for the 
other’s sayings and for sharing something in common with Socrates. 
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James Kastely has argued that what is at stake with Callicles is the 
effect of Socratic politics, because “his project of radical political 
reform, if successful, would invert Callicles’ world redefining what 
noble life is” (Kastely 101). Although Callicles should not be the crite-
rion by which we judge whether Socrates is practicing successfully the 
political art rooted in philosophy and rhetoric, even so, Callicles might 
be the limit case that a politics of noble rhetoric and philosophy has to 
acknowledge. The monologue might be a sign that the community that 
had been established is about to breakdown, that neither Socrates nor 
Gorgias are able to keep the community of dialogue and inquiry alive.
Philosophy rooted in rhetoric and rhetoric rooted in philosophy 
are what has emerged in the dialogue, what emerged from the friend-
ship that Gorgias and Socrates established. The feast of friendship 
between rhetoric and philosophy created a new way of conceiving 
politics, a politics of moving the other through persuasive appeal and 
engaging with the other in a shared dialogue that questions the nature 
of the good and the just. Although this feast is framed in the context 
of a battle, a limitation to the flourishing and cultivation of the com-
munity of dialogue has also emerged in the dialogue with Callicles. It 
seems that there is a lot to say about the shift from dialogue to μῦθος, 
from ἔλεγχος to a narrative form. Yet the monologue shows that 
Socrates still hopes that Callicles’ soul might be moved with the myth; 
Socrates still hopes that the true political art encompassing rheto-
ric and philosophy has no limitations. In other words, Socrates and 
Gorgias are willing to unify refutation and persuasion, diagnosis and 
medication, reflection and motivation. But still, Callicles, a name that 
resembles the Greek word καλός (beauty), might be the unbreakable 
wall for any practice of politics, yet Plato’s silence at the end exhorts 
us to consider if it is a true limitation or not. Socrates’ last words are 
precisely the final attempt to turn Callicles’ soul: “Be persuaded, then, 
and follow me there where, having arrived, you will be happy both 
living and when you have come to your end” (527c5-6). 
“Be persuaded and follow me”. This is the declaration of a Socrates 
that has learned something from Gorgias. If Callicles follows him, then 
we are witnessing a rhetoric that has never yet been seen. If so, Callicles 
can finally mention Socrates as one of the philosophical rhetors or as 
one of the few Athenians that practices the true political art making 
citizens as good as possible.
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